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T
he financial landscape has changed signifi-
cantly since the passage of the Community Re-
investment Act (CRA) in 1977. In this paper we 
provide an overview of how these changes have 
affected the coverage of the CRA, the structure of CRA-
regulated institutions, and their effectiveness in meeting 
the goals of the CRA. By design and necessity we take 
a broad approach. In so doing, we hope to provide a 
useful contextual background for the other articles in this 
volume that focus on changes in the CRA’s implement-
ing regulations, and more specific aspects of the CRA, its 
coverage and effectiveness. 
In 2007, the CRA celebrated its thirtieth anniversary. 
At its enactment, the CRA was a response to the percep-
tion of many that depository institutions had failed to 
meet the credit needs of their communities and that this 
failure was encouraging urban flight and the deteriora-
tion of cities. Reasons expressed for the limited access to 
or availability of credit included social reasons (discrimi-
nation in lending practices), economic reasons (limited 
information on credit; limited access to capital), and 
regulatory reasons (prohibitions on interstate branching 
and mergers; interest rate ceilings). 
The intent of the CRA was not to address each and 
every limitation of the banking system with respect to 
access of credit. It had a particular focus, and Congress 
carefully evaluated some of the benefits provided by  
government to the banking community before determin-
ing that CRA coverage, which would impose some costs 
on institutions, might best be applied to those receiving 
benefits from the federal government. At the time of its 
enactment, Congress determined that CRA regulations 
would apply only to federally insured depositories includ-
ing commercial banks and savings associations (savings 
and loans and savings banks, henceforth S&Ls). As noted 
recently by Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, 
“The obligation of financial institutions to serve their com-
munities was seen as a quid pro quo for privileges such as 
the protection afforded by federal deposit insurance and 
access to the Federal Reserve’s Discount Window.”2
In 1977, households typically saved by keeping 
deposits in institutions covered under the newly enacted 
CRA. Most borrowing by households was conducted 
with these same institutions. The CRA-regulated deposi-
tories, in turn, were generally locally-based, and the 
industry was relatively unconcentrated. These character-
istics have all changed dramatically in the intervening 
thirty years since CRA’s passage. 
The changes in household behavior discussed here 
reflect the response of individuals to an expanded array 
of financial services, arising primarily from the relaxation 
of regulations that affect institutions’ offerings of prod-
ucts and the locations of their activities. Three changes in 
the financial landscape, in particular, are of note, and all 
of these, arguably, have encouraged or allowed financial 
institutions to seek economies of scale or scope in the 
provision of services to communities. 
First, several important legislative changes freed com-
mercial banks and savings associations from regulatory 
constraints in terms of the types of activities in which 
they could participate and the geographies in which they 
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could operate. The first major phase of deregulation took 
place in the period 1979 through 1982. During these 
years there was a rapid increase in interest rates, driven 
primarily by a change in monetary policy that attempted 
to reduce inflation by targeting bank reserves rather than 
interest rates. This caused S&Ls to face negative interest 
rate spreads in the funding of their long-term mortgage 
assets. Further, Regulation Q usury ceilings on savings 
deposits meant that S&Ls faced disintermediation from 
lost deposits as households moved their deposits into 
higher-paying mutual fund accounts. 
In an effort to improve the competitiveness of the 
S&Ls, two important acts were passed. The Depository 
Institution Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 
1980 allowed S&Ls and credit unions to offer check-
able deposits and compete directly with the commercial 
banks for these deposits. It also phased out Regulation Q 
ceilings on savings deposits (over six years) and allowed 
payment of interest on S&L demand deposits. The 1982 
Garn-St.Germain Depository Institutions Act allowed 
savings associations to offer money market deposit ac-
counts and super negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) 
accounts with limited checking features. Federally char-
tered savings associations could also make consumer 
and commercial loans, and offer floating and adjustable 
rate mortgages, expanding their permissible activities. 
A decade later, the Reigle-Neal Interstate Banking 
and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 permitted merg-
ers and acquisitions of financial institutions across state 
lines. Reigle-Neal was passed partially as a response to 
the S&L crisis of the 1980s, and partially in recognition 
that asset size is a factor in the financial health of banks 
and that healthy banks positively affect the stability of 
the banking system.
As a result of the passage of these three acts, financial 
institutions gained newfound abilities to increase in both 
scale and scope. Commercial banks and savings associa-
tions have taken full advantage of this opportunity, and 
the industry has evolved substantially since 1977. 
Second, the emergence of national credit repositories 
and the subsequent development of statistically-based 
credit models have led to the rapid growth of automated 
underwriting systems for all types of lending. This low-
ered the historic reliance of lenders on the local knowl-
edge of their customer bases and provided economies of 
scale in both underwriting and the assessment of credit. 
Both of these also encouraged industry concentration, 
as well as the growth of a national secondary market for 
mortgages and other assets.
Third, there was a rapid growth of secondary mar-
kets for financial products on both sides of the financial 
institution balance sheet. This had two key effects on 
financial institutions.3 First, because of secondary market 
funding, financial institutions now have more alterna-
tives for obtaining capital and have been able, in many 
instances, to obtain their funding at lower cost than 
through deposit growth. Instead of relying primarily on a 
(local) deposit base for raising funds, institutions can rely 
on warehouse lenders and brokers for short-term capital, 
and can use securitization and a broad base of investors 
for long-term funding. Second, the secondary market al-
lows lenders to pool loans from anywhere in the country 
and sell these securities through the secondary market. 
This increases the liquidity of lenders’ assets, dramati-
cally reduces localized variations in lending rates and 
the availability of credit, and reduces credit risks through 
geographic diversification. The growth of the secondary 
market, therefore, encouraged economies of scale and 
stimulated the growth of non-depository institutions not 
covered under the CRA.
These changes, in total, have led to significant altera-
tions in the financial landscape facing the typical United 
States household. Since the time of the CRA’s passage, 
households’ savings/investment and borrowing options 
have expanded, both in terms of products and in the 
types of institutions offering these services. Although 
CRA-regulated institutions still play a dominant role in 
financial markets, many new, non-covered institutions 
have entered the marketplace. Moreover, financial institu-
tions have grown substantially in scale. The result is that 
households’ financial activity is increasingly conducted 
with institutions not covered under the CRA, and the 
institutions with which they do business are increasingly 
national in scale rather than confined to a local footprint.
These changes by themselves, of course, do not speak 
directly to Congress’ concern that financial institutions 
meet the credit needs of their communities. We spend 
some time, therefore, considering how financial institu-
tions’ service to their communities may have changed in 
the face of this evolving financial landscape.
3		 The	securitization	of	mortgages	had,	arguably,	the	largest	impact	on	the	growth	of	nonbank	financial	entities,	but	growth	in	other	asset-backed	
securities	also	meant	that	deposit-taking	was	not	essential	for	lending.Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act
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The rest of this paper is structured as follows. We 
start with a brief discussion of our data and empirical 
approach. We then consider changes in household bal-
ance sheets (savings and borrowing behavior) since the 
passage of the CRA. We follow this with a discussion of 
market share effects, focusing on differences in deposits 
and lending behavior by different types of institutions, 
including those that are CRA-regulated and those that are 
not. We turn next to an examination of the measurement 
of CRA performance over time. Finally, we conclude with 
some thoughts about the current financial environment.
II. The Approach and the Data
We provide a series of charts to illustrate the effects 
of the changing financial landscape on CRA-regulated 
institutions and their success at meeting the credit needs 
of their communities. The charts themselves are based 
on data that are available for download through the 
Federal Reserve Banks of Boston and San Francisco. Un-
derlying these charts and data are a series of consistent 
assumptions and empirical approaches that we outline 
in this section. 
We consider all federally insured commercial banks 
and savings associations to be the CRA-regulated institu-
tions. By this we mean that they must meet obligations 
set forth under the CRA. Generally we distinguish among 
the CRA-regulated institutions by separately looking at 
the top 25 banking organizations (top 25) as measured 
by total dollars of domestic deposits each year (including 
all the depositories and affiliates that belong to the orga-
nization), other large institutions (with “large” indicating 
at least $1 billion in assets) and small institutions (where 
“small” indicates less than $1 billion in assets).4 
As envisioned at its inception in 1977 and, today, the 
CRA encourages federally insured banking institutions 
to help meet the credit needs of their communities in 
a way consistent with the safe and sound operation of 
those institutions.5 The financial institution itself is given 
the ability to define its “community” or the areas in 
which its performance will be assessed. This has become 
known as the institution’s assessment area.6 For purposes 
of this paper we do not have access to the assessment 
areas as defined by each institution, so we approximate 
each institution’s assessment area to include the counties 
in which an institution, in its annual regulatory filing, 
reports that it has a banking office. 
Under the CRA, various performance tests are applied 
to measure each institution’s performance, particularly 
in its assessment area. The performance criteria used to 
assess the institution are flexible, and examination for 
compliance focuses on both the quantity and the quality 
of the institution’s CRA qualifying activities.7 The CRA 
distinguishes between retail activities, regarded as the 
traditional business of banking, and other community 
development activities meant to meet the credit or revi-
talization needs of lower-income borrowers or lower-in-
come neighborhoods. The regulations focus on four cat-
egories of community development, including affordable 
housing, community services, economic development 
through either small business or small farm lending, and 
the revitalization and stabilization of low- and moderate-
income geographies.  For large institutions, evaluation 
also provides sub-ratings on activity-based tests for lend-
ing, investment, and service. 
As a practical matter, assessing the full range of these 
performance distinctions is beyond the scope of this 
article. We primarily focus, therefore, on traditional 
lending activities, particularly residential mortgage 
and small business finance, for which geographic data 
4		 Unlike	the	top	25,	the	large	and	small	institutions	are	defined	only	in	terms	of	the	institution	itself	and	not	the	entire	organization	to	which	they	
belong. Top 25 organizations are separated out because they are the organizations most likely to seek regulatory approval for acquisitions or 
mergers for which their CRA rating is relevant. The further distinction between institutions under or over $1 billion in assets is chosen because 
institutions	above	that	level	are	generally	subject	to	a	different	CRA	performance	evaluation.	In	practice,	this	distinction	has	been	determined	
by	the	“current”	value	of	such	assets,	but	in	our	charts	we	use	an	inflation-adjusted	threshold	normalized	to	the	price	level	at	the	end	of	2007	
for substantive consistency. 
5		 For	an	overview	of	the	history	of	the	CRA,	see	Griffith	L.	Garwood	and	Dolores	S.	Smith,	“The	Community	Reinvestment	Act:	Evolution	and	
Current	Issues,”	Federal	Reserve	Bulletin	(vol.	79,	April	1993),	pp.	251-67.	For	a	discussion	of	recently	proposed	and	current	regulations,	
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reporting is mandated for most institutions under the 
CRA. Within such lending, we look at the percentage of 
loans made to borrowers in low- and moderate-income 
(LMI) census tracts. This approach mimics a common 
performance measure used by CRA examiners. For 
residential mortgage lending, we also include in our 
measure loans to LMI borrowers, regardless of whether 
they reside in LMI geographies.8 
The CRA generally measures performance in a flow 
rather than stock framework. That is, it considers the flow 
of deposit-taking and lending activity within a year when 
assessing performance, not the stock of liabilities and as-
sets on institutions’ year-end balance sheets. Nonetheless, 
data limitations force us to use a combination of stock 
and flow measures in creating our charts and tables. We 
provide data on deposit-taking and lending activity over 
the thirty-year period since the passage of the CRA (1977 
through 2007), which are by necessity of a stock nature. 
We give a considerable focus to mortgage lending, both 
because of its importance and the ready availability of 
the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data. HMDA 
data are provided on a flow basis (yearly originations), 
but are available only from 1990 through 2007. We also 
provide information on small business and farm lending 
that has been reported on a flow basis for the larger CRA-
regulated institutions since 1996.
III. Changes in Household Behavior
Over the past 30 years, households have been pre-
sented with many savings and lending alternatives. As 
financial regulations have changed, so too has house-
holds’ behavior evolved. While we cannot fully docu-
ment all of the changes over the past three decades in 
terms of the proliferation of savings and lending vehicles, 
we do provide information on some select assets and 
liabilities of households. In Exhibits 1 - 3, we present 
information on stocks of household financial assets, 
including checkable and savings deposits (Exhibit 1), 
and outstanding stocks of consumer loans (Exhibit 2) and 
mortgage debt (Exhibit 3).
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Consumer deposits are important for the CRA for two 
reasons. First, as suggested earlier, deposit insurance is 
often viewed as the quid pro quo for the CRA. Second, 
consumer deposits play a role in the performance tests 
for CRA examinations. 
In 1977, at the time of the enactment of the CRA, 
households held 25 percent of their financial assets in 
the form of checking, time and savings deposits in CRA-
regulated institutions. The household share of financial 
assets held in such institutions has declined substantially 
since that time (see Exhibit 1), reaching a low of 11 
percent in 1999 and then rebounding somewhat to 15 
percent in 2007.9 Some of this decline may have resulted 
from the expanding array of other deposit-type vehicles 
available to consumers from non-CRA-regulated institu-
tions. Households’ shares in credit market instruments 
(about one-third of which are money market mutual 
funds), for example, rose by about one percentage point 
over this period. Most of the decline, however, appears 
to stem from a switch in households assets toward the 
holding of non-deposit-type vehicles. In particular, the 
holdings of non-pension equities (including direct stock 
holdings and mutual fund shares) rose from 15 percent of 
households’ financial assets in 1977 to a peak of 38 per-
cent in 1999, and then declining to 25 percent in 2007.
8   Census tract income categories are determined by the ratio of a census tract’s median family income to the median family income of the rel-
evant	surrounding	area	as	measured	at	the	last	Decennial	Census.	The	categories	are:	0-49	percent	(low),	50-79	percent	(moderate),	80-119	
percent (middle), and 120 percent or more (upper). Similar categories are used to classify individual residential mortgage borrowers based 
on	their	income	(as	reflected	in	the	mortgage	underwriting)	compared	to	a	contemporaneous	measure	of	the	median	family	income	of	the	sur-
rounding area as estimated by the Department of Housing and Urban Development. 
9		 Exhibit	1	provides	the	share	of	Household	sector	financial	assets	held	as	deposits	(and	other	financial	assets)	from	the	Federal	Reserve	Board’s	
Flow	of	Funds,	Table	B.100e.	The	deposit	figure	was	adjusted	to	exclude	credit	union	deposits	obtained	from	Flow	of	Funds	Table	L115.	The	
Household	sector	in	the	Flow	of	Funds	accounts	includes	nonprofit	organizations	such	as	foundations	and	universities.Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act
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CRA-regulated Securitized Consumer Loan dollars
During this same period, households changed consid-
erably the types of institutions from which they hoped to 
borrow, particularly when they sought consumer loans 
and mortgages. For example, the share of U.S. consumer 
debt outstanding (as measured in dollars) held at com-
mercial banks and savings associations fell from 57 per-
cent in 1977 to 35 percent by the end of 2007 (Exhibit 
2).10 During that same period, the share of consumer 
loans securitized remained at zero until 1989, increased 
to reach a level of 27 percent in 1998, and has remained 
at roughly that same level.
Exhibit 3 provides equivalent information on the 
change in mortgage debt.11 The share of U.S. home 
mortgage debt outstanding held at commercial banks 
and savings associations fell from nearly three-fourths 
(74 percent) in 1977 to only slightly more than one-
fourth (28 percent) by the end of 2007. At the same 
time, the percent of home mortgage debt outstanding 
that was securitized in the secondary market through 
the use of either mortgage-backed securities (by the 
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs)—Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac) or privately through asset-backed 
securities increased from only nine percent in 1977 to 
58 percent in 2007.
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CRA-regulated Securitized Mortgage Loan dollars
The trends observed in the CRA-regulated institu-
tions’ share of consumer and mortgage loans likely are 
due to two key factors. The first is that, beginning in the 
1980s and throughout the next two decades, institutions 
not covered under the CRA increasingly entered into 
competition with depositories for all forms of household 
borrowings (and savings). One such example is credit 
unions. Compared with commercial banks and S&Ls, the 
role of credit unions in the financial landscape remains 
relatively small. Moreover, they are not the largest 
competitors of CRA-regulated institutions. They remain 
interesting, however, because they have federally insured 
deposits but are not covered under the CRA. The data 
indicate that credit unions have increased their share 
of household deposits (increasing from four percent in 
1977 to almost ten percent in 2007) and home mort-
gage lending (rising from about one-half of one percent 
of mortgage assets in 1977 to three percent in 2007). 
However, the credit union share of consumer lending 
simultaneously declined from 14 percent in 1977 to nine 
percent in 2007. 
The second key factor that explains changing pat-
terns in loans to households is the rapid growth in 
loan securitization. The secondary market dramatically 
increased the investor base for these assets, and reduced 
the relative importance of a deposit base for purposes 
of funding loans to consumers. In the mortgage market, 
for example, the rapid growth in volume and liquidity of 
the mortgage-backed securities (MBS) issued by Freddie 
10  The data for this exhibit come from the Federal Reserve Data Release Table G19, also part of the Flow of Funds, table L222, lines 1, 6, 7 and 10. 
All consumer debt as measured in these data is owed by the household sector. 
11   The data for this exhibit come from the Flow of Funds Table L218, lines 1, 11, 12, 18 and 19. Home mortgage debt is calculated as all residential 
mortgage	debt,	including	1-4	family	and	farm	houses.	Home	equity	loans	are	included	in	these	data.	Most	home	mortgage	debt	is	owed	by	the	
household sector (about 94 percent in 2007). Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act
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Mac and Fannie Mae has meant that wholesale lenders, 
through a broker network, can originate loans to distrib-
ute as securitized assets. Under this model, mortgage 
lenders need not rely at all on traditional checkable or 
savings deposits for funding, but rather can borrow the 
funds needed to make loans using a line of credit from a 
warehouse lender, originate mortgages, combine and sell 
them into secondary market securitized pools, and use 
these proceeds to repay the line of credit. This method 
of interjecting capital into the credit market effectively 
bypasses the localized deposit collection and lending 
activity model that was central to mortgage funding at 
the time of the CRA’s passage in 1977. 
It is likely that all of these changes have had both 
significant and subtle impacts on lending and deposit-
taking by CRA-regulated institutions. In the next section, 
we explore how these changes may have impacted insti-
tutions of different size classes in different ways. 
IV. Changes in the Structure of  
Financial Institutions
Like households, financial institutions were also 
responding to changes in both the legislative and 
regulatory environments that allowed for growth and 
consolidation across the country. To illustrate some of 
these changes, we provide a series of charts that show 
the changing market share of CRA-regulated institutions 
grouped by asset size. 
A. Offices and Deposits
In order to look at market shares, we need to define 
a unit of measure for the financial institution. One such 
measure, the “office,” is generally used as the unit of 
accounting for depositories covered under the CRA and 
other regulations.12 Deposits held by an institution must 
be assigned to a particular office, and the office location 
is used to define the geographic reach of the institution 
within their self-defined assessment area. This is critical 
not only to the Lending Test under CRA examinations, 
but also to the branch Service Test where particular focus 
is paid to offices in LMI neighborhoods.
One way to track the localized focus of institutions, 
therefore, is to consider trends in the average number of 
offices per institution—the greater the average number 
per institution, the more widespread (less localized) the 
activity. In 1977, fully 54 percent of the nation’s 18,834 
federally-regulated commercial banks and savings asso-
ciations were unit institutions—that is, they had a single 
location, with a single office, and no branches.13 By 
2007, however, the share of unit institutions had fallen to 
only 24 percent (out of 8,605 federally insured banking 
institutions). The last 30 years, moreover, have led to the 
concentration of assets among the largest institutions. In 
1977, for example, there was an average of 3.5 offices 
per institution. By 2007, this figure had more than tripled 
to 11.5 offices per institution.
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Top 25 Large Small
The increasing concentration of the banking industry 
is illustrated by trends in the market shares of offices 
owned by institutions of different size classes as shown 
in Exhibit 4. Beginning in the mid-1980s, the share of of-
fices held by the top 25 organizations steadily increased 
while the share of offices held by small institutions de-
clined. Clearly, the top 25 institutions have commanded 
an increasing share of offices as they have grown more 
geographically dispersed in their activities. Interestingly, 
we do not observe a dramatic drop in the share of offices 
of the large institutions, which is consistent with the 
considerable share of banking activity these institutions 
retain in the United States. 
12		While	state	law	sets	the	definition	of	what	constitutes	an	office,	generally	it	includes	the	institution’s	self-defined	main	office	and	any	branches	
(but	not	stand	alone	automated	teller	machines	or	ATMs).	An	institution	with	four	branches	operates	a	total	of	five	offices.
13  The information here (and in Exhibits 4, 5 and 6) is based on annual June 30th	Summary	of	Deposits	(Federal	Deposit	Insurance	Corporation	
(FDIC))	and	Thrift	Financial	Reports	(Office	of	Thrift	Supervision	(OTS))	offices	filings.	Data	since	1994	are	available	at	http://www2.fdic.
gov/hsob/hsobRpt.asp.	Data	for	earlier	years	are	based	on	the	authors’	calculations	using	information	from	the	national	archives	and	Federal	
Reserve	Board	records.	Data	include	offices	in	U.S.	territories.Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act
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Top 25 Large Small 
Trends in the concentration of deposits mirror those 
of offices. As evidenced in Exhibit 5, the market share of 
total deposits held by top 25 CRA-regulated organiza-
tions grew significantly from under 20 percent in 1977 
to over 50 percent by 2007. At the same time, from 1977 
to 2007 the share of deposits held by small institutions 
fell from over 40 percent to under 20 percent. The largest 
institutions have been getting larger, and the industry is, 
therefore, becoming more concentrated.
The growth in the size of CRA-regulated institutions 
over the past 30 years was accompanied by a more 
geographically dispersed focus of these same institu-
tions. Depositories were largely locally-based at the time 
of the CRA’s passage in 1977, consistent with the CRA’s 
focus on allocating lending within a geographic market. 
However, as noted above, deposits became increasingly 
concentrated in larger institutions over the past 30 years. 
Accompanying this increase was a reduction in the share 
of deposits that institutions collected in the same MSA as 
their main office. This latter trend is illustrated in Exhibit 6. 
In 1977, all three groups of institutions (by asset size) 
collected the vast majority of their deposits in the same 
MSA as their main office. This largely remained true of 
small institutions through 2007. However, the share of 
deposits collected in the MSA of their main office for 
large institutions declined consistently, and the share 
for the top 25 depository organizations declined from 
over 80 percent in 1977 to under 25 percent in 2007. 
Some of this decline is an artifact of the decline in the 
number of institutions relative to offices (thus fewer main 
offices). However, most of the decline reflects a real 
increase in geographic reach of larger institutions, much 
of it expanding across state lines. In 1977, for example, 
there were no nationwide depository institutions. By 
2007, most of the top 25 organizations had truly become 
national organizations, drawing deposits (and lending) in 
markets across the United States.
Exhibit 6 












































Top 25 Large Small
Collectively these changes in industry structure have 
had significant implications for the CRA. When origi-
nally passed, the CRA was designed for an institution 
operating in a single urban market and for an environ-
ment with a large and diverse set of financial institutions. 
As just shown, this model no longer applies to much of 
the marketplace which is increasingly dominated by a 
small number of very large institutions that operate in 
many different markets.
B. Lending Activities
Not surprisingly, the concentration in deposit col-
lection over the past 30 years has been associated with 
increased concentrations in consumer lending. Exhibit 
7 shows the share of consumer loan dollars held by 
depositories of different size classes over the period 
1977 through 2007.14 Again, we see rapid growth in the 
dominance of the top 25 organizations, from holding 15 
percent of consumer loan dollars in 1977 to holding 70 
percent in 2007. This was accompanied by a concomi-
tant decline in the share of consumer loan dollars held 
by small institutions, from nearly 50 percent in 1977 to 
under ten percent in 2007. 
14		The	information	in	Exhibits	7	and	8	is	calculated	from	end-of-year	Call	Report	(commercial	banks	and	some	savings	banks)	and	Thrift	Finan-
cial Reports (S&Ls and other savings banks) data. Some data for the late 1970’s and early 1980’s had to be imputed by the authors because of 
changes in the information collected in the reports. Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act
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Exhibit 7 





























Top 25 Large Small
Similar trends are apparent in the shares (in dollars) 
of single-family (one- to four-unit) residential mortgage 
lending held by institutions of different size classes 
(Exhibit 8). Again, we see dramatic growth in the share 
of mortgage dollars held by the top 25 CRA-regulated 
organizations, accompanied by declines in the shares 
held by both large and small institutions. 
Exhibit 8





























Top 25 Large Small
Not only has mortgage lending among depositories 
become more concentrated over the past 30 years, 
the share of mortgages originated by institutions not 
covered by the CRA has increased. We track this trend 
using HMDA data, which allow us to consider changes 
using a flow concept (originations) that is arguably 
more consistent with the focus of the CRA than the 
stock concepts thus far discussed. Unfortunately, the 
use of HMDA restricts us to going back only to 1990; 
before that point HMDA reporting only applied to CRA-
regulated institutions.
Exhibit 9 shows the share of total mortgage origina-
tions for the top 25 organizations, large institutions, 
small institutions, and institutions not covered by the 
CRA.15 Non-covered institutions include independent 
mortgage companies and credit unions. The increasing 
share of mortgage originations by the top 25 organiza-
tions is quite evident, as is the declining share of origina-
tions by small institutions. Among mortgages originated 
by CRA-regulated institutions, therefore, mortgages 
increasingly are originated by depositories with a large 
(often national) footprint.
Exhibit 9








































Top 25 Large Small Non-CRA regulated
Also evident is the dramatic increase in the share of 
originations by non-CRA-regulated institutions in the 
early 1990s, from 17 percent in 1990 to a high of 40 
percent in 1993. Since then, while the share of mortgage 
originations by these institutions has trended somewhat 
downward, it has generally remained over 30 percent.
The rise in the importance of mortgage originations 
by non-CRA-regulated institutions was coincident with 
the rise in importance of securitization (as shown in 
Exhibit 3) and the increasing role of subprime lending, 
a large share of which originated with independent mort-
gage companies. Regardless of its cause, the increased 
role of mortgage originations by non-covered institu-
15		Data	are	calculated	based	on	single	family,	first	lien	mortgage	loan	originations	reported	annually	under	HMDA.	Data	here,	and	in	other	
exhibits using HMDA data, are based on loans rather than loan dollars and exclude loans in U.S. territories and those for which geographic data 
are missing. Lien status is only reported since 2004. Prior to that year, we assume a threshold of loan size above and below $50,000 in 2007 real 
dollars	to	distinguish	first	and	junior	lien	loans.	HMDA	data	include	originations	only	by	depositories	with	offices	in	an	MSA	and	distinguish	
between	loans	extended	directly	and	those	extended	by	a	subsidiary	or	affiliate	of	the	depository.	Depositories	with	assets	below	$30	million	are	
not	required	to	report.	Exhibit	9	includes	loans	extended	by	subsidiaries	and	affiliates	when	computing	institution	or	organization	loans.Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act
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tions reflects an important trend. At the time of the CRA’s 
passage, CRA-regulated institutions with local footprints 
originated the vast majority of mortgages. Since then, 
and especially starting in the mid-1990s, institutions not 
subject to CRA regulations increasingly originated mort-
gages in competition with CRA-regulated institutions. In-
creasingly, therefore, mortgage lending expanded out of 
the reach of CRA regulation, although this trend shows 
signs of reversing with the collapse of the subprime 
mortgage sector in 2007. 
The CRA does not, however, focus only on mortgage 
lending. Regulatory changes to the CRA in 1995 placed 
increased emphasis on performance measures related to 
small business and small farm lending, defined as loans 
of $1 million or less for small business and $500,000 
or less for small farm.16 Data on this lending from 1996 
through 2007 are shown in Exhibit 10.
Exhibit 10







































Top 25 Large Small Non-Bank
Market trends in small business and farm lending 
look markedly different from those of consumer and 
mortgage lending. The top 25 market share of consumer 
loan dollars outstanding rose by over one-half from 1996 
to 2007, and almost doubled for home mortgage loan 
dollars outstanding over the same period (earlier shown 
in Exhibits 7 and 8). In contrast, the market share of the 
dollars outstanding of small business and farm loans 
for the top 25 rose only from 24 to 32 percent over the 
same period. Moreover, the absolute share of the small 
business and farm market of the top 25 was only about 
one-half their share of the consumer and mortgage loan 
market in 2007. Clearly, small business and farm lending 
makes up a decreasing relative percent of the lending by 
top 25 institutions, while growing to a relatively larger 
role among small institutions.
V. Changes in CRA Performance Measures
CRA performance can be assessed across many 
dimensions. All CRA-regulated institutions are judged 
on their lending activity. The Lending Test includes 
measures for many types of loans, including home 
mortgage, small business, and small-farm loans. Larger 
institutions also receive ratings for service and invest-
ment activities.17 The Service Test evaluates institutions’ 
retail banking delivery systems and institutions’ commu-
nity development services, innovativeness and respon-
siveness. The Investment Test considers qualified invest-
ments with assessment area community development as 
their primary purpose. All these tests are combined into 
an overall CRA rating.
Tracking trends in CRA performance tests can provide 
useful insights into how well the law is working, a topic 
we pursue in this section. We focus on four quantita-
tive metrics of performance. First we consider a metric 
related to the Service Test. Next, we turn to two metrics 
related to the Lending Test—lending in LMI areas and 
lending in and out of the institution’s assessment area. 
Finally we look at institutions’ overall CRA ratings. 
A. The Service Metric
One of the questions asked under the CRA is how 
well regulated institutions are serving their communi-
ties. One commonly used CRA Service Test metric is 
16  Starting in 1996, larger institutions were required to report annually on their small business and small farm loan originations by census tract. 
Larger	institutions	for	this	purpose	were	defined	to	be	those	with	over	$250	million	in	assets	or	over	$100	million	in	assets	and	part	of	an	orga-
nization with over $1 billion in assets. These regulations were amended in 2005 to require reporting only of institutions with $1 billion or more 
in assets (although smaller institutions can, and do, report voluntarily). Unfortunately smaller depositories are not required to report small 
business	and	farm	origination	data,	so	it	is	impossible	to	discern	market	trends	from	the	flow	data.	However,	since	1993	all-sized	institutions	
have	been	required	to	report	balance	sheet	data	on	small	business	and	small	farm	loan	dollars	outstanding	using	the	same	loan	definitions	as	
the origination data. 
17		Larger	institutions,	for	this	purpose,	were	defined	to	be	those	with	over	$250	million	in	assets	or	over	$100	million	in	assets	and	part	of	an	
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the percentage of offices in LMI tracts. The trends in 
this percentage between 1997 and 2007 are shown in 
Exhibit 11.18 
Exhibit 11

























Top 25 Large Small
Trends in the LMI share of offices do not seem to vary 
significantly with asset size of institution. As is clear, 
however, the percent of CRA-regulated institutions’ offic-
es in LMI census tracts decline modestly throughout the 
30-year period. There is a striking increase in this share 
in 2003, but this likely reflects the change in definition 
of the LMI census tracts in that year, as well as, possibly, 
the increased activity by depositories in lower-income 
areas as credit standards were relaxed. 
Interpreting the decline in the share of deposits or 
banking offices in LMI census tracts as a reflection of 
the CRA may be problematic. Of concern, there were 
roughly an equal proportion of banking offices and 
population in LMI census tracts in 1977, but by 2007 
the office share was lower than the population share (20 
percent versus 26 percent). On the other hand, however, 
the absolute number of banking offices in LMI census 
tracts increased by 25 percent over the 30 years since 
CRA’s passage. 
Thus, the decreased share of LMI offices reflects 
higher office growth in middle- and high-income tracts 
rather than office closures in LMI areas. Moreover, the 
growth of offices into these non-LMI census tracts may 
have actually increased the ability of institutions to 
serve their communities. In particular, the relaxing of 
state branching laws that allowed institutions to increase 
their geographic reach may have allowed institutions 
with main offices in commercial districts, which were 
nominally LMI but sparsely populated, to expand into 
the residential communities where their LMI and other 
customers lived.
B. The Mortgage Lending Metric
The CRA was meant to encourage institutions to meet 
the lending needs of borrowers in their assessment areas, 
and particularly those of LMI neighborhoods and LMI 
borrowers. Lending tests look at both metrics separately, 
but for ease of exposition we have combined these two 
lending activities and refer to this as LMI lending. 
Exhibit 12 uses HMDA data to provide the LMI shares 
of mortgage originations over time.19 As was the case 
with offices, these data show a trend that is largely undif-
ferentiated by type of institution. Unlike offices, howev-
er, there is a fairly consistent upward trend in the percent 
of LMI lending by CRA-regulated institutions over this 








not assigned tracts in the 1980 and 1970 Census; consequently we chose to use the 1990 tract designation for this period.






their	loans	in	LMI	tracts	in	1994	versus	17	percent	in	2007,	figures	that	support	the	view	of	an	increased	amount	of	LMI	lending.Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act
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Top 25 Large Small
As a consequence, LMI borrowers and tracts are receiv-
ing a greater share of the mortgage activity of CRA-regulat-
ed institutions, while contributing a reduced share to these 
institutions’ deposit base. Moreover, these trends start from 
a point where the case could be made that LMI customers 
were underserved. For example, the 1990 Census shows 
that 16 percent of all owner-occupied single-family homes 
were in LMI tracts, versus a ten percent overall average 
LMI-tract share for CRA-regulated lenders in 1994. By 
2007, the average CRA-regulated lender share of loans in 
LMI tracts had risen to 17 percent, a figure equal to the 
2000 Census percent of owner-occupied single-family 
homes in LMI tracts. Arguably, therefore, there has been a 
positive high-level trend in CRA performance. 
However, while there appears to be strong evidence 
that LMI mortgage customers have enjoyed an expan-
sion of service from CRA-regulated lenders in the last 
15 years, it is not clear how much of this, if any, can 
be attributed to the CRA. While CRA-regulated lenders 
increased the share of their LMI mortgages from 26 per-
cent in 1994 to 34 percent in 2007, non-CRA regulated 
institutions increased their share of lending to such 
customers by a similar amount, from 29 percent to 35 
percent. Moreover, within CRA-regulated organizations, 
the growth in LMI share (from 27 percent in 1994 to 35 
percent in 2007) was somewhat greater in subsidiary/
affiliate lending, which is only voluntarily considered for 
CRA evaluation, than it was for lending directly done by 
CRA-regulated depositories (26 percent to 33 percent).
The similarity of changes in the share of lending go-
ing to LMI customers for lenders facing different regula-
tory environments suggests that either the growth of LMI 
lending stems from market rather than regulatory forces, 
or that other regulatory forces beyond the CRA may have 
played a role. One such regulatory change that might 
have contributed to the growth of LMI lending by non-
CRA regulated lenders over this period was the enact-
ment of affordable housing goals for Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac by the Congress in the mid-1990s. 
Similar to the quantitative lending activity require-
ments under the CRA, albeit not so deeply targeted, 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac face annual percentage of 
business requirements on their purchases of mortgages 
that serve LMI borrowers, borrowers in underserved 
areas, and special affordable populations.21 Mortgages 
that satisfy CRA requirements qualify under the afford-
able housing goals, and may be counted toward these 
requirements if purchased by Fannie Mae or Freddie 
Mac. However not all mortgages counting toward the 
affordable housing goals satisfy CRA requirements or 
are originated or purchased by CRA-regulated institu-
tions. So, although the CRA and the affordable housing 
goals of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac both encourage 
LMI lending, some of this activity may occur outside 
CRA reporting channels.22
We next turn to the share of mortgage lending that 
institutions do within their own assessment areas. CRA 
requirements pertain primarily to activities within institu-
tions’ assessment areas, so an increase in the share of 
activity outside assessment areas is of potential concern. 
Exhibit 13 illuminates this aspect of CRA performance. 
21		Underserved	areas	are	currently	defined	in	metropolitan	areas	to	be	census	tracts	with	median	incomes	less	than	or	equal	to	90	percent	of	area	
median income, or tracts with minority population greater than or equal to 30 percent and median incomes less than or equal to 120 percent of 
area	median	income.	Slightly	more	flexible	guidelines	apply	for	underserved	rural	areas.	Special	affordable	populations	are	currently	defined	as	
borrowers with incomes less than or equal to 60 percent of area median income, or borrowers with incomes less than or equal to 80 percent of 





borrowers outside such tracts would have been even larger if measured to 2006 before the collapse of the subprime market. On the surface this 
evidence	suggests	that	LMI	tracts	were	previously	underserved	and	have	now	caught	up.	Yet	there	was	very	little	change	in	the	percentage	of	
owner-occupied	units	in	LMI	tracts	from	1990	to	2000	censuses.	If	the	2000	Census	data	on	owner-occupancy	does	not	reflect	the	potentially	
strong	growth	of	housing	in	LMI	areas	post-2000,	it	is	possible	that	these	areas	may	remain	underserved.Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act
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Top 25 Large Small
We find that small institutions have continued to 
originate a fairly large share of mortgages within their 
assessment areas (around 70 percent). Not surprisingly, 
however, the growth in the size of the top 25 organi-
zations is associated with a decline in the percent of 
mortgages they originate within their assessment areas. 
In particular, the top 25 organizations fell from almost 
an 80 percent share in 1990, to originating only 46 
percent of their mortgages within their assessment area 
after 1994. The share of lending in assessment areas also 
declined for large institutions, dropping from slightly 
over 70 percent in 1990 to less than 30 percent in 2005. 
Since then, however, there has been a surge back up to 
nearly 40 percent in lending in assessment areas among 
large institutions in 2006 and 2007.
The concentration of activity among larger CRA-reg-
ulated institutions (as shown in Exhibit 9 earlier) raises a 
potential concern because a reduced share of mortgage 
activity in assessment areas accompanies it (as shown in 
Exhibit 13). To further explore this concern, we turn in 
Exhibit 14 to a comparison of LMI mortgage lending by 
institutions within and outside their assessment areas.23 
Ideally, from a CRA perspective, the share of LMI lending 
in assessment areas will be greater than or equal to the 
share of LMI lending out of assessment areas. There is, 
therefore, potential reason for some concern if the op-
posite is the case. 
Exhibit 14




































Top 25 Large Small
Exhibit 14 shows that small institutions generally 
perform well by this metric, consistently providing LMI 
mortgage lending within their assessment areas at rates 
twice that outside their assessment areas. In contrast, top 
25 and large institutions show a decline in this metric 
throughout the mid-1990s. Since the mid-1990s, the top 
25 have leveled off to a ratio where their LMI lending 
rates are about equal within and outside their assessment 
areas. In even starker contrast to small institutions, large 
institutions now originate LMI mortgages at a lower rate 
within compared to outside their assessment areas.
Overall, therefore, trends among different-sized insti-
tutions almost balance each other out. In particular, the 
increase in the share of lending going to LMI customers 
from all CRA-regulated institutions lending within their 
assessment areas (27 percent in 1994 to 34 percent in 
2007) is virtually the same as the change in the share of 
such lending outside their assessment areas (26 percent 
in 1994 to 33 percent).
Potentially troubling, nonetheless, is the dramatic de-
cline in mortgage lending within assessment areas by the 
top 25 and large institutions. By this view, increased con-
centration has reduced overall mortgage lending within 
assessment areas, arguably reducing the coverage of the 
CRA. Moreover, because much of the out-of-assessment 
area lending is associated with affiliates of the larger insti-
tutions, it may not be subject to scrutiny under the CRA.
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C. Higher-Rate Mortgage Lending
Since 2000 there has been a dramatic increase in 
mortgage originations by subprime lenders. Much of this 
activity has been conducted by independent mortgage 
companies, which are not depository institutions and so 
not subject to the CRA. Disproportionately, these lenders 
originate loans at rates substantially higher than those 
offered by prime lenders. 
Considerable regulatory scrutiny has been directed 
towards these higher-rate loans, generally defined as loans 
originated above the HMDA rate-spread reporting thresh-
old.24 It has been a particular focus within the context of 
the CRA, because higher-rate mortgages disproportionately 
appear to be originated in LMI census tracts. The CRA’s 
intent has been to promote LMI lending within assessment 
areas. However, the intent has never been to encourage 
LMI lending only at higher-rates than borrowers with higher 
incomes, or in higher income communities, can obtain. 
Exhibit 15 provides the distribution of the higher-rate 
mortgage originations across CRA-regulated and non-
CRA-regulated (independent mortgage banks and credit 
unions) institutions. The data needed to assess higher-rate 
mortgage lending are reported in HMDA only starting in 











































Top 25 Large Small Non-CRA regulated
The exhibit shows that until 2006 the largest share 
of the higher-rate mortgages came from institutions not 
subject to the CRA. During this same period, not sur-
prisingly, small institutions originated a smaller share 
of higher-rate loans and top 25 organizations and large 
institutions originated a proportionately larger share.25 
In 2007, however, the subprime market collapsed 
and 169 lenders (almost all non-CRA-regulated) 
stopped reporting in HMDA.26 This led to a dramatic 
decline in the volume of higher-rate mortgage lending 
(not shown), as well as a decline in the share of higher-
rate mortgages originated by institutions not covered 
under the CRA. 
From a CRA perspective, the 2007 changes are, 
arguably, welcome news. In particular, CRA-regulated 
institutions, rather than those outside the CRA regulato-
ry structure, are increasingly responsible for the origina-
tion of higher-rate loans. Because of this, CRA-regulat-
ed institutions, and regulators, may have an increasing 
opportunity to strike the appropriate balance on how 
best to serve borrowers in this market niche.
D. Small Business and Farm Lending
Larger institutions are subject to lending performance 
tests related to their small business and small farm lend-
ing. Examiners typically use similar tests to those used for 
mortgage lending, comparing LMI to total lending and 
lending within and outside of assessment areas. However, 
unlike with mortgage lending there is no direct analog to 
a LMI borrower for a business, so typically only the busi-
ness’ location is used to determine its LMI status.
Exhibits 16, 17 and 18 present data on small business 
and small farm loan originations for the period 1996 to 
2007, using the same metrics as used for mortgages in 
Exhibits 12, 13 and 14. Exhibit 16 shows overall trends 
in LMI lending over the period; Exhibit 17 presents evi-
dence on lending in- and out-of-assessment areas; and 
24	 HMDA	requires	the	reporting	of	first	lien	loans	where	the	annual	percentage	rate	is	300	basis	points	more	than	a	comparable	Treasury	rate.	






groups was about the same. This suggests that differences in the overall incidence of high rate lending did not stem from a differential focus on 
LMI	customers	by	CRA-regulated	institutions,	but	rather	from	the	choice	of	product	offered	to	such	customers.
26   See Robert B. Avery, Kenneth B. Brevoort, and Glenn B. Canner, “The 2007 HMDA Data,” Federal Reserve Bulletin (December 2008).Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act
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Exhibit 18 gives the relative propensity for LMI lending 
for assessment area versus non-assessment area loans.27
Exhibit 16
Share of LMI Small Business and Small Farm


































































Top 25 Large Small
Exhibit 17





















Top 25 Large Small
Exhibit 18
Ratio of Shares of Small Business and Small Farm Lending in 




























Top 25 Large Small
The data for small business loans show a somewhat 
different pattern than those shown for mortgage loans. 
Exhibit 16 shows a largely constant level of LMI lending 
over the ten-year period, although there is, arguably, a 
slight decline among top 25 institutions. In-assessment 
area lending shows a clear decline for all-sized institu-
tions, especially so starting in 2004 (Exhibit 17). CRA-
regulated institutions show an equal propensity toward 
LMI lending both in- and out-of-assessment areas 
through 2003. Starting in 2004, however, institutions 
originate a higher share of LMI loans in their assess-
ment areas. 
Overall, these trends are small in comparison to 
those for mortgages and there are significant differences 
by size of institution. Of potential concern is the reduc-
tion in in-assessment area lending by CRA-regulated 
institutions. Mitigating this, however, is the fact that in-
assessment area lending shares are higher than those for 
mortgage lending. Moreover, the within-assessment area 
LMI lending rate shows a relative increase at precisely 
the time when in-assessment shares decline, explaining 
why overall LMI lending shows almost no trend. On the 
basis of these trends, therefore, arguably there is little rea-
son for focus or concern regarding the small business and 
farm lending performance of CRA-regulated institutions.
 
E. Overall CRA Ratings 
Finally, we turn to an analysis of overall CRA ratings. 
Under the revised final CRA regulation that became 
effective July 1, 1995, as under the earlier regulation, 
CRA-regulated institutions are to be assigned one of 
four statutory ratings. Every institution’s rating—either 
Outstanding, Satisfactory, Needs to Improve, or Substan-
tial Noncompliance—is posted and includes a written 
evaluation explaining the rating.28 The public release of 
this information about CRA performance continues to be 
an important aspect of the regulations. The CRA rating 
is especially important because the regulatory agencies 
consider an institution’s CRA record when evaluating its 
application for deposit insurance, or for a charter, branch 
or other deposit facility, office relocation, merger or 
acquisition. For our analysis, therefore, we focus on the 
Outstanding and less than Satisfactory (Needs to Improve 
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because it implies the least difficulties for institutions, 
the latter because it implies the most.
Each CRA-regulated institution is assigned a primary 
federal banking agency regulator that conducts its CRA 
exam. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC) is primary regulator of commercial banks with 
national bank charters, including most of the top 25. The 
Federal Reserve Board (FRB) is the primary regulator of 
state-chartered commercial banks that are members of 
the Federal Reserve System. The Office of Thrift Supervi-
sion (OTS) is the primary regulatory authority over most 
savings associations, and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) has primary authority over state-
chartered, non-FRB-member commercial banks and 
some federally-chartered savings banks. 
Exhibit 19 provides information, by regulatory agen-
cy, on those institutions receiving Outstanding ratings 
from 1990 – 2007. The exhibit shows that, since 2000, 
a considerably larger share of OTS-regulated institutions 
has received Outstanding ratings as compared to FDIC-
regulated institutions. 
Exhibit 19
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Regulatory agencies also differ in the percent of less 
than Satisfactory CRA ratings they give. Exhibit 20 indi-
cates that a small share of institutions continues to re-
ceive either Needs to Improve or Substantial Noncompli-
ance ratings, but that the share of those with poor ratings 
(since 1995 when the regulation changed) is marginally 
highest for OTS-regulated institutions.
Exhibit 20
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It is not only the regulatory supervision process that 
varies with CRA ratings. The size of the institution also 
seems to matter. Exhibits 21 and 22 present informa-
tion parallel to that in Exhibits 19 and 20, but separated 
by size of institution rather than regulatory agency. The 
largest organizations (top 25) clearly perform best as 
measured by their share of Outstanding ratings, and their 
differential above large and small institutions increased 
substantially starting in 2003. Arguably this reflects the 
importance that the largest institutions place on good 
performance ratings in an effort to reduce CRA impedi-
ments to mergers or acquisitions.  
Exhibit 21
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Exhibit 22






































Top 25 Large Small
Exhibit 22 shows that the top 25 institutions have 
historically been less likely to receive unsatisfactory 
ratings. Since 1996, however, there has been little dif-
ference in the unsatisfactory rate across institution size, 
with levels generally ranging under one percent. This 
may reflect “satisficing” behavior on the part of de-
positories, ensuring that they at least do not receive an 
unsatisfactory rating given the increased public scrutiny 
of CRA performance. 
VI. Concluding Comments
Since the passage of the CRA in 1977, the financial 
market has evolved in several ways that have poten-
tially critical implications for the CRA. First, the share of 
financial activity covered under the CRA has declined 
substantially. This occurred for two key reasons: (1) the 
growth of financial institutions not covered by the CRA, 
and (2) the reduction in in-assessment area activity by 
the larger CRA-regulated institutions. Second, the foot-
print of financial institutions has increased dramatically. 
No longer is financial activity largely locally-based. In-
stead, institutions that operate across several states, if not 
nationally, conduct most financial activity. Third, there 
has been an increase in LMI lending, although much of 
this occurs outside of assessment areas and it is debat-
able how responsible the CRA is for this trend. 
We leave it to others to fully assess the implications of 
these changes for the CRA. We note, however, that today 
we are arguably in the midst of the most dramatic finan-
cial changes of the past several decades. We conclude, 
therefore, with some observations of how these changes 
may affect CRA-regulated institutions. 
First, we expect to see that CRA-regulated institutions 
will regain market share. This reflects several recent 
changes. Independent, non-chartered investment 
banks no longer exist—they have either merged with 
depositories, or become bank-chartered institutions. 
The collapse of the subprime mortgage sector means 
that institutions not covered under the CRA have lost 
significant market share. Finally, with the current credit 
and liquidity crisis, borrower confidence has fallen 
to historic lows, and the importance to households of 
keeping deposits in federally insured institutions has 
grown. These trends, arguably, will all serve to give the 
CRA increased leverage and importance.
Second, we expect increased concentration among 
CRA-regulated institutions. The current financial crisis 
has already led to a number of mergers and acquisitions, 
and we expect this trend to continue. The impact of this 
trend on the overall performance of CRA-regulated insti-
tutions is far from certain. On a positive note, as concen-
tration among CRA-regulated institutions has increased, 
so too, arguably, has overall CRA performance (although, 
as we have noted, such trends are less apparent in small 
business lending and may be due to other market forces). 
Potentially troubling, however, is that increased concen-
tration in mortgage lending, if historical trends continue, 
could reduce the overall share of in-assessment area 
mortgage lending, arguably reducing the impact of the 
CRA. Further, much of the lending of larger institutions—
even if done in assessment areas—has been done 
through affiliates rather than directly by depositories and 
thus may be subject to a different degree of regulatory 
scrutiny. How these forces balance out will determine 
whether CRA regulations have an increased or decreased 
impact on the marketplace.
Finally, underwriting standards have tightened signifi-
cantly in primary, secondary, and mortgage insurance 
markets, likely significantly reducing the share of higher-
rate mortgage originations. This may mean that there 
is less access to credit for LMI borrowers and in LMI 
neighborhoods. If that trend is observed, the importance 
of the CRA may increase as it mandates focus on these 
otherwise less well served areas. This may be abetted by 
the changes to the affordable housing goals for Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac included in the Housing Eco-
nomic Recovery Act of 2008, which more closely align 
the purchase goals of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with 
those of the CRA. Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act
46
Robert B. Avery is a senior economist in the Division of 
Research and Statistics at the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System.  Prior to rejoining the Board of 
Governors in 1994 he was a professor at Cornell Univer-
sity.  His work at the Federal Reserve focuses on supervi-
sory issues related to community affairs and bank super-
vision.  He is a coauthor of a number of recent studies in 
these areas including the Federal Reserve’s Congressional 
Report on Disparate Impact in Credit Scoring, and Fed-
eral Reserve Bulletin articles on the 2004, 2005, 2006 
and 2007 HMDA data and revisions to the CRA in 2005.     
He also designed the Federal Reserve’s fair lending 
HMDA screening program and its loan sampling system 
for small bank safety and soundness examinations.  He 
has a BA from the University of Pennsylvania and a PhD 
from the University of Wisconsin.
Marsha J. Courchane is vice president at Charles River 
Associates and heads their financial economics practice.  
Dr. Courchane specializes in financial institution analyses 
for regulatory reviews and in support of litigation. She is 
a leading expert in the areas of mortgage and consumer 
lending and has worked with many of the largest lenders 
in the United States.  Her client work and research focus 
on fair lending, affordable lending, credit scoring and the 
origination, pricing, and securitization of mortgages.   
Dr. Courchane held a number of academic and profes-
sional positions prior to her consulting experience includ-
ing serving as director of Financial Strategy and Research 
at Freddie Mac and as senior financial economist at the 
OCC.  She has published in several journals including 
the Journal of Real Estate Research, Journal of Economics 
and Business, Housing Policy Debate, Applied Econom-
ics, Journal of Housing Research, Journal of Real Estate 
Finance and Economics, Canadian Journal of Economics 
and Property Management.  She serves on the editorial 
board for the Journal of Housing Research, the Journal 
of Real Estate Research and for the International Journal 
of Housing Markets and Analysis and referees for several 
journals.  She serves as the executive vice president of 
the American Real Estate and Urban Economics Associa-
tion from 2008 – 2013 and was elected to the American 
Real Estate Society Board of Directors in 2008.
Peter Zorn is currently vice president of Housing Analy-
sis and Research at Freddie Mac, where he has been 
employed since 1994.  Prior to his work at Freddie 
Mac Zorn, was an associate professor in the depart-
ment of Consumer Economics and Housing at Cornell 
University.  He has a PhD in Economics from the Uni-
versity of California, Davis, and a BA in History from 
Marlboro College.   